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THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT AND
THE ADMINISTRATION OF INCOME
ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN NEW MEXICO
JOSEPH GOLDBERG t
MARICLAIRE HALE tt

Any discussion of the impact of the New Mexico Equal Rights
Amendment on the quality of life in the state of New Mexico
must, of necessity, consider the effect of that amendment on the
administration of public assistance or "welfare" programs in the
state. That this is so is demonstrated most manifestly by the fact
that the large majority of persons receiving some type of welfare
assistance in the state of New Mexico are women. More
importantly, for those persons who do receive welfare assistance,
the administration of these programs so permeates their lives,
reaching into virtually every corner, that even the most subtle
changes in the administration of the various programs will have a
direct and substantial effect on the quality of life of the
recipients.'
"Welfare" is one of those terms (and, indeed, connotative
concepts) that is virutally incapable of precise definition. How
extent,4
one defines the term "welfare" depends, to2 a considerable
3
on his or her perspective. Thus, income, medical or housing
assistance to the poor have traditionally fallen within a commonly accepted understanding of the term. On the other hand, other
types of governmental assistance programs, such as farm price
supports or the recent assistance to Lockheed Aircraft, could also
be considered to be "welfare," viewed from a particular perspective. 5 However, for purposes of this article, we can adopt a
workable definition of "welfare" by limiting it to income
6
assistance programs administered by governmental agencies.
t Assistant Professor of Law, University of New Mexico School of Law.
" "J.D., University of New Mexico School of Law, 1972.
I. See Dooley and Goldberg, The Search for Due Process in the Administration of Social
Welfare Programs,47 N.D. L. Rev. 209, 209-211 (1971).
2. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq., 601 etseq., 1201 etseq., 1351 etseq. (1964).
3. See, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 etseq., 1395 et seq. (1971).
4. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 1401 passim (1964).

5. See, Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 332 (1971) (Douglas, J. dissenting); R. O'Neil, The
Price of Dependency 292-318 (1970).
6. Generally, income assistance programs fall in two broad classes: those "cateporical
assistance" programs funded and administered cooperatively by the state and federal
governments, see 42 U.S.C. Il 301 et seq., 601 et seq., 1201 et seq., 1351 et seq. (1964), and those
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It will be the purpose of this article to discuss the impact and
effect of the New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment on the
administration of income assistance programs in the state of New
Mexico. In doing so, we will first discuss the nature and
administration of income assistance programs in this state. We
will then introduce, with brief discussion, the New Mexico Equal
Rights Amendment. Next, we will explore the present administration of state welfare programs to highlight some instances in
which the sexes have been treated differently. Finally, we will
attempt to determine whether the proposed Equal Rights
Amendment (ERA) will require a change in such programs and
suggest possible remedies for apparent conflicts.
NEW MEXICO PUBLIC ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

The administration of income assistance programs in the
United States has been termed an area of "cooperative federalism."'7 This description recognizes that in the administration of
most income assistance programs in this country, the responsibility for providing assistance is not considered to be wholly a
federal function or wholly a state function. Since the New Deal
of the 1930's, both the federal and the state governments
cooperate in providing income assistance to eligible persons.
With the risk of overgeneralization, "cooperative federalism"
in the administration of public assistance programs functions in
the following manner: (1) the federal government assumes a
substantial share of the cost of providing assistance to recipients
in the participating state; 8 (2) the state government assumes the
burden of day-to-day administration of the programs; and (3) in
consideration of the federal government's contribution to the
costs of the program, the state agrees to conform its regulatory
practices concerning eligibility and administration to federal
programs administered and funded by the states alone, e.g., N.Y. Soc. Serv. Law to 157-166
(McKinney Supp. 1970). There are four categorical assistalice programs, defined by reference to
the groups eligible to receive the income assistance benefits: Old Age Assistance (OAA), 42
U.S.C. 1§ 301 et seq. (1964); Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC, 42 U.S.C.
U601 et seq. (1964); Aid to the Blind (AB), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201 et seq. (1964);. Aid to the
Permanently and Totally Disabled (APTD), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351 etseq. (1964). The definition of
income assistance programs can of course, be expanded to include other governmental assistance
programs such as the Federal Old Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance program (OASDI), 42
U.S.C. 01401 el seq. (1964); or unemployment compensation programs jointly funded and
administered by the federal and state governments, 42 U.S.C. § 1101 etseq. (1964).
7. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 316 (1968).
8. 42U.S.C.11601,603,608(1971).
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guidelines. 9 In practical terms, what this means is that any person
concerned with the administration of these programs in the state
of New Mexico must look not only to the state statutes and
regulations but also to the federal statutes and regulations. Thus,
where the state welfare statutes and regulations are found to be
in conflict with the New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment, the
inquiry has not ended. Recourse must be had to the applicable
federal statues and regulations to determine whether the state
regulatory criteria are mandated by the federal statutes and
regulations. If that is found to be the case, then serious problems
of federalism arise concerning how the conflicting state statute
and regulations may be brought into conformity with the ERA.
One further note is in order. Although the United States
Supreme Court in the past year has gone far in federalizing the
administration of public assistance programs,10 there yet remains
some latitude in the states as to how they will administer the
programs. However, Congress is presently considering-as it has
for the past three years-legislation which will federalize the
entire administration of public assistance programs. 1 Standards
for eligibility, amount of assistance and continued receipt of
assistance by recipients would become wholly federal. If such
legislation becomes law, wholly different problems of federalism
will be present as to those new federal criteria which may be in
conflict with the New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment.
The public assistance programs administered in New Mexico
may be broken down into two broad categories: (1) Aid
to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC);12 (2) Aid to the
Aged, Blind, and Disabled (AABD). x3 The largest single program, both in the amount of persons participating and in the
amount of money expended, is the AFDC program. The AFDC
program is federally supported. The AABD program is actually
three separate federally-supported programs, combined for administrative purposes by the state. Both of these programs are
administered in New Mexico by the Department of Health and
Social Services.
9. See 42 U.S.C. § 602 (a)(10) (1970); Doe v. Shapiro, 302 F.Supp. 761 (D.Conn. 1969), aff'd
396 U.S. 488 (1970).
10. See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
11. See H.R. 1, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971).
12. N.M. Stat. Ann. 113-1-26 (Repl. 1968).
13. N.M. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-1-23, 13-1-25 (Repl. 1968).
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EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT

"Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or by any state on account of
sex."' 14 So reads the proposed amendment to the United States
Consititution now undergoing ratification in the state legislatures.
"No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without
due process of law; nor shall any person be denied equal
protection of laws. Equality of rights under law shall not be denied
on account of sex."u 5 The emphasized section of the above
passage is the amendment to Article 2, Section 18 of the
Constitution of the state of New Mexico. The amendment was
passed by both houses of the New Mexico legislature in its 1972
session, approved by the electorate in the November 1972
election and will go into effect on July 1, 1973.
Substantively, the two equal rights amendments are quite
similar and would entail the same changes in the laws to which
they might apply, if similarly interpreted. Of course, the New
Mexico amendment would apply only within the geographical
jurisdiction of the state while the United States amendment by its
terms would apply to the federal government and all state
governments. Since the New Mexico Amendment will go into
effect on July 1, 1973, it will become operative before the federal
amendment.
It has often been argued that the presence of the Equal
Protection Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution (and, presumably, in the New Mexico
constitution) precludes the necessity for an Equal Rights Amend16
ment abolishing governmental discrimination based on sex.
Historically, however, the Equal Protection Clause has not been
applied by the courts to discrimination based on sex in the same
manner that it has been applied to discrimination based on racial
characteristics. 17 Indeed, the insensitivity of the courts to challenges of discrimination based on sex, 18 has led most persons
14. S. Joint Res. 8, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess. (1971); H.R. Joint Res. 35, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess.
(1971).

15. N.M. H. J. Res. 2, 30th Legis., 2nd Sess. (1972).
16. See Kanowitz, The Equal Rights Amendment andthe Overtime Illusion, I N.M. L. Rev. 461,

464-65 (1971).
17. Eg., Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908); see L. Kanowitz, Women and the Lawpassim
(1969), but see Thorn v. Richardson, I CCH Pov. L. Rep.

1405.58 (D.C. Wash., Nov. 23, 1971).

18. In a 1968 decision, United States v. St. Clair, 291 F. Supp. 122, 124-125 (S.D.N.Y.), the
court, in dismissing an equal protection challenge to the draft, stated that women are exempt from
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active in this area to conclude that the surest and quickest way to
accomplish the result of outlawing discrimination based on sex is
to press for the passage of an Equal Rights Amendment. As one
proponent notes,1 9 the ERA offers broader protection than the
Fourteenth Amendment because it specifically prohibits the
federal and state governments from denying or abridging rights
on the basis of sex. In addition to reaching explicit federal, state
and municipal action, the amendement would apply to probate
action in which there is significant government involvement.
Thus, while the Equal Protection Clause may be construed in
such a way as to invalidate many sex-based discriminations, past
judicial construction and the length of time it would take to
evolve a more responsive judicial attitude under the Equal
Protection Clause indicate that the ERA is not redundant.
THE AFDC PROGRAM

The AFDC program came into existence in 1935 with the
passage of the Social Security Act.2 0 Prior to that time, federal
participation in income assistance programs had been non-existent and the problem was one that had been left to the states to
deal with as they saw fit. While most states had some type of
work relief program, flowing directly from, and having remarkable similarity to, the Elizabethan "Poor Laws,''21 by the turn of
the twentieth century it was fairly well recognized that these
programs, consisting primarily of "poor houses" and forced
labor, were unsuitable to meet the needs of a substantial class of
indigent persons. Attention was focused on the needs of indigent
children, mainly products of broken or incomplete homes. In
1909, the White House Conference on the Care of Dependent
Children was called. From this conference came a new class of
welfare programs, commonly called Mothers' Pension programs,
which provided income assistance to the mothers of neglected or
dependent children. By 1935, every state in the union, save two,
had some type of Mothers' Pension program. 22
Certainly, the advent of this new type of welfare program
the draft since they are "still regarded as the center of home and family life" and that "men must
provide the first line of defense while women keep the home fires burning."
19.

Murrey,

The Negro Women's Stake in the Equal Rights Amendment, 6 Harv. Civ.

Rights-Civ. Lib L. Rev. 253, 258-59 (1971).
20. See42U.S.C.§601etseq.(1971).

21. See Rosenheim, Vagrancy Concepts in Welfare Law, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 511 (1966).

22. W. Bell, Aid to Dependent Children 6 (1965).
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brought benefits to a large class of people. However, along with
the monetary benefits came another type of "benefit," perhaps
more undesirable. As Professor Charles Reich so aptly put it, the
poor "are an irresistible temptation to moralists, who want not
'2 3
only to assist but to 'improve' by imposing virtue." Thus, the
new Mothers' Pension programs provided a unique opportunity
for the dominant culture to impose its values on some of the
more vulnerable members of the society at the time. Deviant
social or cultural behavior could be powerfully regulated and
affected through the administration of these new programs. This
moralistic impulse was combined with another, more practical,
consideration. As Winifred Bell points out in an extensive study
of the AFDC program:
Through the early period there was vigorous debate at social
welfare forums over the virtues and vices of the new [Mothers'
Pension] laws. The mere existence of Mothers' Pension programs
caused an uneasy awareness of the plethora of poor
mothers. . . . It was clear that unless the mothers were carefully
screened and the approved group rigorously limited, funds would
be exhausted soon. . . . Within the first year [in Illinois], 17 of the
306 families approved for payments were discontinued "because of
the death of the mother or her 'conceded unfitness.' "24

The practical need to limit eligibility, and thereby to limit
expenditures, combined with the moralistic impulse to impose
virtue, resulted in a set of severe strictures on the recipients of
this new program. These new strictures came to be called
"suitable home" provisions, the effect of which was to limit initial
and continued eligibility for relief to those mothers who conducted themselves and their homes in such a way as would be
considered "suitable" to the local welfare agency. The language
of the statutory or regulatory provisions often explicitly excluded
unwed mothers, or prohibited male borders from being present
in the home. 25 In practice, however, the zeal of the local welfare
administrators was far greater than even that of the legislators:
the result was that the program was limited, in practical effect, to
"gilt-edged" widows; unwed, divorced or separated mothers were
excluded; 26often all mothers from minority racial groups were
excluded.
23. Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 Yale L.J. 1245,
1251-52 (1965).
24. W. Bell, supra note 22.
25. Id. at 7-8.
26. Id. at 9-10.
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The advent of the Social Security Act in 1935 and the
federalization of the Mothers' Pension programs into the AFDC
program did not provide substantial relief from the "suitable
home" provisions. Many states, especially those in the South,
continued their "suitable home" provisions, often making them
more stringent. It was not until 1968 that these regulations were
declared illegal by the United States Supreme Court. 27 While the
presence or absence of "suitable home" regulations is not directly
relevant to the question of the impact of the Equal Rights
Amendment on present AFDC administration, it does serve to
demonstrate two points. First, the AFDC program flowed
directly from, and retained many of the characteristics of, the old
Mothers' Pension laws, which were aimed specifically at women.
Secondly, the strong impulse toward moralization along the
norms of the dominant culture manifests that discrimination in
these programs may flow not only from the language of the
statutes and regulations, but also from the attitudes of the
administrators. These lessons are important in any attempt to
isolate sexist discrimination in the administration of the program.
Underlying assumptions concerning women and their roles
provide a framework for the regulatory structure of the AFDC
program. It is only against the background of these underlying
assumptions that specific regulatory provisions may be viewed.
Theoretically, since the turn of the century, our society has made
the policy decision that children living in it should not be allowed
to starve. AFDC has been established to provide assistance to
needy children who have been deprived of parental support
because of death, absence or incapacity. 28 This means, in effect,
almost always providing assistance to children who have been
deprived of a father. Ninety-five percent of all adult AFDC
recipients are women.2 9 The payments are not made out of
recognition of the value to society of the work being done in the
home by the mother but rather to support the children. The
welfare system does not recognize motherhood as an economically valid and necessary role. The mother is rather grudgingly given
a "free-ride." 30
27. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309(1968).
28. See42U.S.C.§ 601,606(1971).
29. Comment, Failure of the Work Incentive (WIN) Program, 119 U. Pa. L. Rev. 484, 499
(1970).
30. See 42 U.S.C.A. 602(a)(7) (1969). The N.M. Dept. of Health and Social Services Manual
(hereinafter cited to as HSSD Manual) § 221.81E.2. states:
2. The mother of the dependent child-The mother's requirements may be included
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The California case of Ramos v. Montgomery,31 perhaps
inadvertently said some rather interesting things about the
assumptions underlying the AFDC programs:
Foster parents perform many intangible services for their foster
children. Natural parents have a moral, if not a legal obligation to
perform those services. The labors of cooking, washing, ironing
clothes, cleaning house, etc., not to mention the time and patience
needed to aid in the development of the child's character are all
foster
necessary aspects of his support. To provide these services
32
parents must give up much of their privacy in daily affairs.

The court, of course, did not consider it necessary to mention
the natural parent on whom these burdens would normally fall.
These same tasks also cut deeply into the daily affairs of the
natural mothers, but this is considered the "wages" of motherhood. In the Ramos case, the plaintiff brought an equal protection challenge to the payment of $48 per month per child living
with its natural mother as compared with $105 per month per
child living in a foster home. The court found that the disparity
of these payments did not constitute arbitrary, unreasonable, or
invidious discrimination. It held that the state had a resonable
basis for establishing two rates of payments. The basis, it seems,
must be the societal conviction that mothers work for nothing.
Even if the father is not in the home, as he often is not, the
legislature has decided that this less than complete family
situation is the cheapest and best method for raising the children.
"Through cash grants adjusted to the needs of the family it is
possible to keep young children with their mother in their own
home. This is recognized by everyone to be the least expensive
and altogether most desirable method of meeting the needs of
these families that has yet been devised."'33 One is tempted to
speculate that this method is recognized as the most desirable
because it is the least expensive, and it is the least expensive
because it effectively exploits the ethos of motherhood economically. As may well be obvious by this point, there is a positivie
economic value to the work done by a homemaker in her home.
in the budget group, and she is eligible for federal matching, if she is eligible for
financial assistance on the conditions of non-concurrent receipt of other financial
assistance, and need. The mother must also meet the condition of residence, if the
dependent child is unborn or less than one year old.
The mother is not eligible for inclusion in the budget group if she is married and
her husband, with whom she is living, is not incapacitated.
31. 313 F. Supp. 1179 (S.D. Calif. 1970).
32. Id. at i183.
33. S.Rep. No. 628, 74th Cong. (1935).
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It is clear that the entire economic structure of the AFDC
program is based on assumptions concerning the role of women
and mothers and their moral or legal obligations to provide free
services to the family group. The state and federal governments
may keep the costs of the program down by not considering as
costs or expenses the value of the labor expended by the mother
in caring for a family. It may be argued that the entire structure
of support payments in the AFDC program is based on
assumptions concerning moral and legal obligations of parents as
an entity; and on further assumptions of roles of individual
parents in meeting those obligations. These latter assumptions
are that it is the role of the male (father) to go out and make an
income and bring it back to the family unit as a means of
purchasing goods and services not normally provided in the
home. It is the role of the female (mother) to stay in the home
and provide services that are normally considered to be the
mother's functions; i.e., maternal care, ironing, cooking, supervision, etc. Thus, when the father is absent from the home, the
basis of the AFDC support payment to the child is to substitute
the missing factor which the father normally provides:3 4 i.e., the
money to buy goods and services not normally provided in the
home; albeit the AFDC payments are made at a level of
minimum need. No provision is made in the AFDC support
payment to the child to compensate for any missing services
normally provided in the home. The assumption is that it is the
mother who always provides these services and since she is
present, the services will be provided. The result is that the
structure of AFDC payments forces the mother into a particular
role and into providing these services, whether or not that is her
choice.
These assumptions become more patent in the foster care
situation, where it is assumed that there is no moral or legal
obligation on the part of the foster parents to provide these
services normally found in the home. Therefore, the AFDC
payment to the child is raised to reflect the cost of purchasing
these services and to provide the means to do so. While, on a
theoretical basis, the entire structure of AFDC support payments
may be attacked under the ERA as resting on sexist discrimina34. The same underlying assumptions manifest themselves in the AFDC regulations governing
the situation where the mother is absent from the home and the father is seeking AFDC assistance
for the child and himself. See pp. 93 through 95 infra.
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tions as to the role of individual parents, it is doubtful that such a
frontal assault would be successful as a practical matter. On the
other hand, the ERA could provide a basis for a more compelling
attack on the foster care provisions, since the underlying assumptions are more patent in that context.
"The AFDC program was designed to meet a need unmet by
programs providing employment for breadwinners. It was designed to protect . . . 'one clearly distinguishable group of children.' . . . This group was composed of children in families
without a 'breadwinner,' 'wage earner,' or 'father.' . . . To
describe the sort of breadwinner it had in mind, Congress
employed the word 'parent.' . . . A child would be eligible for
assistance if his parent was deceased, incapacitated or continually
absent."35s On the face of it, it would appear that either "parent"
might be incapacitated or absent and the other might be equally
eligible for AFDC. However, the criteria are not the same. In
New Mexico, the child may collect AFDC when the mother is
absent or incapacitated and the father is present only if (1) the
father is unable to work and needed at home; or (2) the father's
income would be insufficient to pay a housekeeper. 36 If any
35. King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 328-29 (1968).
36. HSSD Manual § 221.724 states:
221.724-DEATH, CONTINUED ABSENCE OR PHYSICAL OR MENTAL
INCAPACITY OF MOTHER-ADDITIONAL CONSIDERATIONS WHEN
FATHER IS IN THE HOME AND IS FULLY OR PARTIALLY EMPLOYABLE. If it has been determined that the child on behalf of whom an application for
AFDC has been made is deprived of the care of his mother because of death,
continued absence or physical or mental incapacity of his mother, and if a partially
or fully employable father is in the home, then a child is eligible on this factor if:
A. the father is needed in the home and for that reason is unable to seek or
continue employment; or
B. if the employment of a housekeeper or provision of day care for the child
creates a deficit between the father's net income from earnings and the family's
requirements according to departmental standards.
A father is not considered to be needed in the home if adequate child care is
available. The following resources for child care must be evaluated in connection
with this determination:
(1) The availability and ability of other members of the family to care for the
children either on a free or paid basis.
(2) The availability of adequate child care services or housekeeping services in the
community on an employed basis.
(3) The possibility of moving to a locality where adequate care of the children can
be arranged through relatives or employed services.
(4) The possibility of the participation of the mother in caring for the children
where appropriate.
The case record must contain information regarding the planning with the father
for care of the children and the basis for the determination that the father is needed
in the home if such a determination is made. The record must also reflect
verification of net income from employment and payment for child care if eligibility
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relatives can be coerced into taking care of the children, the
father is not considered to be needed at home. As one group of
researchers has noted:
The same criteria do not apply where the situation is reversed and
the mother is capable of working and the father is incapacitated.
The regulation is just one of several which reinforces the idea that a
mother's place is always in the home, while the father is practically
disallowed from caring for his children by remaining at home.3 7

The differing considerations concerning the eligibility of the
child for AFDC payments, depending on whether it is the father
or the mother absent from the home, raises once again, the
underlying assumptions of role differentiation based on sex. It is
clearly implicit in this regulation, as it is in regard to the foster
care situation, that it is the role of the male to go out and work
and bring in income, to the family unit; and it is the role of the
female to stay at home and provide the traditional "maternal"
services to the family. Just as the AFDC support payments, by
not providing a need factor for the purchase of services normally
found in the home, force the female to remain in the home and
assume these duties, the regulation discussed in the preceding
paragraph patently forces the male to leave the home and
provide the traditionally male role: i.e., bringing in the income.
The male is not allowed, under his own free choice, to assume the
traditionally female role. Clearly, this type of differentiation runs
afoul of the ERA.
While the regulation concerning eligibility when the father is
present and the mother is absent is most likely invalid as being in
contradiction to federal regulations, 38 an elimination of the
regulation so as to put fathers on parity with mothers in regard to
eligibility of the family unit for AFDC assistance may not
necessarily solve the problem. As one welfare worker admitted,3 9
it is not unusual for welfare caseworkers to bring to bear subtle or
not so subtle pressures on recipients to play the role and perform
the functions that are normally ascribed to the parent on the
basis of his or her sex. These attitudinal problems are equally as
important as more patent discriminations in the regulatory
on this factor is established under B. above. See Section 223 for procedures
following approval on this factor.
37. New Mexico Equal Rights Legislative Comm., A Report on Possible Effects of the Equal
Rights Amendment 4 (1972).
38. See Carleson v. Remillard, 406 U.S. 598 (1972).
39. Conversation of Tricia Rouloriette with author, May 28, 1972.
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provisions. Indeed, it may be argued that they are more
important for two reasons. First, it is more difficult to isolate and
identify discriminations that flow from individual caseworkers
than it is to find discrimination in the regulations. Secondly, the
caseworker, representing the sole or major source of income to
the recipient, is in an enormously powerful position to influence
the attitudes and responses of the recipient.
Another section of the New Mexico AFDC regulations which
is potentially and practically discriminatory on the basis of sex is
the section which deals with the age eligibility of children for the
program benefits. All dependent children under the age of 18 are
eligible. In order to be eligible from the age of 18 through 21, the
regulations provide that the child "must be regularly attending
and making satisfactory progress in a school, college or universitechnical
ty, or regularly attending a course of vocational or
'40
training designed to fit him for gainful employment.
It is clear from the regulation that the eligibility provision will
have a substanitally greater disabling effect on women that it will
on men. First, attendance in vocational or technical training, as a
basis for eligibility, is limited only to those courses that fit the
person for "gainful employment." This provision rests on an
underlying assumption that the only activity worthy of merit
(and, hence, AFDC support) is one that is directly related to
employment for wages. Since, as discussed above, other AFDC
regulations already assign the woman her role in the house and
substantially preclude her from seeking outside employment, the
indigent woman suffers a double discrimination. On the one
hand, the regulatory provisions impel her toward assuming the
traditional maternal functions; and then on the other hand, the
age eligibility provisions do not recognize any training in that
area as worthy of support by means of continued eligibility for
AFDC. As with the other provisions discussed, this provision
substantially eliminates the free will of the indigent person to
assume the role of his or her choice. If the potential recipient
wished to be considered eligible from the ages of 18 through 21,
the individual would have to assume the traditional male role of
seeking outside employment for wages.
Perhaps, the discriminatory impact of this regulation is best
illustrated by a hypothetical example. Assume that a mother and
two children are a family unit receiving AFDC assistance. One
40. HSSD Manual1 221.41B.
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child is age 18 and the other is 11. The older child is a woman.
Under this regulation, upon reaching the age of 18, the older
child will no longer be eligible for AFDC assistance unless she is
in a school, college or university, or pursuing, satisfactorily, some
vocational or technical training. If, however, the child or the
mother considers it more desirable for the child to stay within the
home and furnish assistance in caring for the younger child or
other members of the family group, the child will not be eligible
for further assistance. This is so, although the experience the
child may be receiving in the home is valuable preparation for
the maternal role which she may wish to play in later years. Here,
the child has no choice. If she wants to prepare for the
traditionally maternal role, she is disabled from further assistance.
It may be argued that the regulatory provision applies equally
to males and females: that if the child in question were a male
and wished to stay in the home to help and prepare for a role that
is traditionally ascribed to the woman, he also would be disabled
from doing this and retaining his eligibility. While on the face of
the regulation this is true, such an argument ignores or belies the
realities of human experience. If there are two children in the
home, and if the presence of one in the home is necessary to help
out, absent other extraneous considerations, normally, it is the
female child who will be pressured to remain in the home and the
male child will be pressured to seek employment or train for
employment. It can be seen that the regulation in question, rather
than recognizing this reality, discriminates against it.
The New Mexico regulatory provision in question here is
substantially identical to a federal statutory requirement that is
made mandatory on the states. 4 1 Thus, the question becomes how
the arguable violation of the New Mexico Equal Rights Amendment can be remedied. Since the federal requirement is mandatory on the states, the state cannot eliminate the discriminatory
provision. However, the federal requirement is mandatory only
insofar as the state participates in the federal fund-sharing
program. There is nothing in the Social Security Act which
prohibits the state from making its eligibility requirements
broader and more encompassing than the federal requirements.
If the state does this, there is no violation of the federal statute;
the only result that flows from broader eligibility standards is that
41. See Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
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the federal government will not provide financial support for
those persons who are eligible under the 'state's broader standards
but not eligible under the federal standards. Thus, the remedy for
any violation of the ERA in this area would be for the state either
to drop out of the federal sharing program of AFDC or if it
wished to remain in the AFDC program, to adopt a broader
eligibility classification for persons within the ages of 18 through
21, making all such persons eligible, and not seeking federal
Tonetary support for the new class of eligible persons. The latter
alternative is the only practical one, since the attraction of the
federal monetary participation in the AFDC program is so great
as to practicably preclude the state from dropping out of the
program.
THE AFDC-UF PROGRAM

There presently exists a federal supplemental program to the
AFDC program in which the state of New Mexico does not
participate. This program is commonly referred to as the AFDC
Unemployed Father (AFDC-UF) program. Under the applicable, federal, statutory wording, AFDC benefits may be extended
to children in families where the father,42 rather than being dead,
absent or incapacitated, is unemployed.
The AFDC-UF program originated in 1961. As originally
conceived, AFDC benefits were extended to families where a
"parent" was unemployed. Thus, as the original enactment
stated: "Effective for the period beginning May 1, 1961, and
ending with the close of June 30, 1962, the term 'dependent child'
shall . . . include a needy child .. . who has been deprived of
parental support or care by reason of unemployment . . . of a
parent. . . ." 43As the Senate Finance Committee Report on this
bill stated:
The bill is intended to provide funds so as to enable States to aid
needy unemployed persons and their children who are not eligible
for aid in which the Federal Government participates. . . .It is
intended that any additional Federal funds provided . .. are to
be made available for assistance (or additional assistance) to needy
44
families in which the breadwinner is unemployed. ....

in 1962,45
The original bill, as passed in 1961 and extended
42. 42 U.S.C.§ 607(1971).
43. Act of May 8, 1961, Pub. L. No. 87-31, § 1,75 Stat. 75.
44. 1961 U.S. Code, Cong. & Admin. News 1717.
45. Act ofJuly 25, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-543, tit. I § 131(a), 76 Stat. 193.
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remained in force for six years until 1967. In that year, the statute
was reworded to drop references to "unemployed parents" and
substitute references to "unemployed fathers." '46 The reason for
this change was stated clearly by the Senate Finance Committee
Report on the bill:
This program was originally conceived by Congress as one to
provide aid for children of unemployed fathers. However, some
states make families in which the father is working and the mother
is unemployed eligible for assistance. The bill would not allow such
situations. Under the bill, the program could apply only to children
47

of unemployed fathers.

Several considerations come to mind immediately. First, how
could the committee report state that the program was "originally
conceived" to provide aid to unemployed fathers only? The
wording of the original statute read "parents" and was not
limited to fathers. The same committee, in reporting out the
original bill in 1961, said that the program was designed to aid
families where the "breadwinner" was unemployed. It is obvious
that either the 1961 Committee, the 1967 Committee or both
assumed that only fathers could be breadwinners! Irrespective of
the semantic confusion, it is clear that by 1967 Congress was
desirous of clearing up any mistakes. Women were not to be
considered breadwinners. Again, the underlying assumptions
concerning the roles of men and women in the family unit
controlled and were given force in statute. Men were the
breadwinners and women were relegated to the home, presumably to the washing, cooking and ironing; tasks to which the AFDC
program ascribes no economic value so long as it is the natural

mother who is performing these services. 48 That this is patent
discrimination based on sex need not be belabored. That such
discrimination would run afoul of the New Mexico Equal Rights
Amendment is also obvious.
New Mexico, at present, does not participate in the AFDC-UF
program. So long as this program is considered optional with the
states, and New Mexico chooses not to participate, there is no
problem with the ERA. If, however, the program becomes
mandatory for those states participating in the AFDC program, 4 9
or if New Mexico decides it wishes to participate in the
46. Act of Jan. 2, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-248 § 203, 81 Stat. 882.

47. 1967 U.S. Code, Con$. & Admin. News 2997.
48. See pp. 90-94 supra.

49. See Townsend v. Swank, 404 U.S. 282 (1971).
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AFDC-UF program, then there is a conflict with the ERA. In
such a situation, it would appear that New Mexico would have to
extend the program to include those situations in which the
woman is unemployed.
THE WORK INCENTIVE PROGRAM

Closely connected with AFDC in many states is the Work
Incentive (WIN) program. Although the WIN program is presently in a state of flux, 50 the way it has heretofore operated has
been quite discriminatory in its application and theory. The
program is aimed at training and placing unemployed persons in
the work force; but rather than basing acceptance into the
program upon individual need and motiviation, there are arbitrary guidelines as to the priority of acceptance.
The required order of evaluating individuals for the WIN
program is as follows:
Federal regulations require that states evaluate individuals in a
specified order (U.S. Dep't of Health, Education and Welfare,
Guidelines for the Work Incentive Program § 61.1 (1969) beginning with AFDC unemployed father. Mothers and other caretaker
relatives who volunteer for WIN and are currently in a program
under Title V of the Economic Opportunity Act, or in a CWT
program are evaluated next. Presumably these individuals are
already motivated to work or to be trained and have access to child
care programs. The third group comprises "[diependent children
and essential persons age 16 or over who are not in school, at work,
or in training, and for whom there are no educational plans under
consideration."
Mothers who volunteer but are not already in existing training
programs constitute the next group if they have no pre-school-age
children and the fifth group if they do. Thereafter the state welfare
agency may evaluate for referral any other recipients. . . . Of the
five groups, the regulations require assessment of only the first
(unemployed fathers) and the third (youth and essential persons
individuals, but
sixteen and over). States need not assess any other
51
if they do, they must follow the prescribed order.
50. In December, 1971, the statutory provisions governing the WIN program were substantially amended, to become effective on July 1, 1972. Pub. L. No. 92-223 (Dec. 28, 1971). These
amendments are popularly known as the "Talmadge Amendments." While the changes effected in
the WIN program through these amendments are substantial and intricate, the most significant
changes involve (I) the requirement of registration for work as an eligibility condition for AFDC
[Pub. L. No. 92-223 3(a)(2)] and (2) a shifting of emphasis from training to job placement. The
HEW regulations implementing these amendments have not been completely published and state
implementation of the changes has been sporadic.
51. Comment, supra note 29, at 487.
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These regulations work from the arbitrary assumption that
mothers of young children can always best serve them by staying
at home. A mother is not permitted to make her own decision
that she might in some instances best serve the children by
working. In some states, because of the arbitrary priorities of
referral, the mothers of even school-aged children cannot be
placed in the WIN program. 52
The policy argument given for this priority system is that a
man is more likely to be quickly trained and to drop out of the
WIN program to take a job. When he has done so, he will be able
to get his family off of the welfare rolls. Women, on the other
hand, typically are not quickly trained for jobs which will be
sufficiently lucrative to enable them to take their families off
AFDC:
A special six-state Department of Labor survey of 4,623 employed
WIN participants in follow-up status found that only 42.2 percent
of the men and 9.9 percent of the women had sufficient earnings to
be ineligible for assistance. Median hourly wages for men were
$2.47 but only $2.02 for women. The low figures for women
enrollees reflect the generally lower earnings of women in our
53
society.

The WIN program is caught in the bind between the need to
train enrollees for "demand occupations" and the need to train
women. While 95% of the adults on AFDC are women, only 71%
of WIN enrollees are women. 54 However, rather than facing the
problem squarely and realizing that women are the ones most
desperately in need of good training programs, the WIN program
discriminates against women and tries to explain away its lack of
success by the fact that it had to deal with women:
And the preponderance of women enrollees has created a serious
problem in training enrollees for "demand occupations." . . . The
local job market . . . particularly in rural areas, hold[s] few jobs
for women without advanced clerical skills. WIN staff in these
areas anticipated that it would be a matter of years bringing most
WIN enrollees up to the required skill levels. The few jobs
available to most of the women enrollees were primarily limited to
low paying, highly unstable service jobs such as domestics and
55
charwomen.
52. See Walker, Sex Discrimination in Government Benefit Programs, 23 Hastings L.J. 277, 286
(1971).
53. Carter, The Employment Potential of AFDC Mothers: Some Questions and Answers, 6
Welfare Law in Rev. I, 3 (July, Aug. 1968).
54. See Comment, supra note 29, at 499.
55. Id. at 498.
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If this situation can be seen as a hardship for the WIN
program, it must be viewed as even a greater hardship for the
women who face this job market:
In excluding women from WIN by giving men priority for
participation, the legislators have saved money at the expense of
women. What the legislators are saying by this is that they are not
particularly concerned with increasing a person's chances in life by
training them for better opportunities, rather their specific concern
is with getting people off welfare and saving the state money. Since
women will probably stay on welfare anyway,even after training,
their participation in WIN is given lower priority. The fact that the
large majority of families on welfare are headed by women who are
cycle because they lack such
unable to break out of the poverty
56
training seems to be overlooked.

As it now stands, since the required order of evaluating
individuals for the program discriminates on the basis of sex, it
would be unacceptable under the ERA. Therefore, the whole
program might necessarily be excluded from New Mexico, unless
there were enough training programs for all applicants and the
discrimination in the order of evaluation were thereby rendered
meaningless. In the alternative, if New Mexico was disabled from
dropping participation in the WIN program, or if it desired not
to, the state would have to set up an alternative training program
to put women on a parity with men.
AID TO THE PERMANENTLY AND TOTALLY DISABLED

Another income assistance program which reflects discriminatory attitudes of our society and of our welfare system is the
program designed to provide aid to the permanently and totally
disabled (APTD).5 7 As contrasted with the AFDC program,
which starts from a premise that children are inherently incapable of providing for themselves and therefore need assistance
where the family unit is disfunctional, the APTD program
proceeds from a premise that adults are inherently capable of
self-sufficiency and it is only when some disfunction completely
disables them that the government, through an income maintenance program, will become involved.
The regulatory guidelines which define eligibility for the
program are characteristically unclear. Thus, the applicable New
Mexico regulation states that in order for a person to be eligible
56. Walker, supra note 52 at 289.
57. N.M. Stat. Ann. I 13-1-4(a)(Repl. 1968).
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for assistance under this program, he or she must demonstrate a
condition of permanent physiological, mental or psychological
impairment that, when "considered in connection with the
pertinent socio-economic conditions, results in his being substantially unable to engage in employment or homemaking within his
remaining ability."'58 In addition to this definitional regulation,
the welfare agency is required to make an "analysis" of the
socio-economic factors involved5 9 to be transmitted to the
"review team" which makes the eligibility determination.
It is not
clear exactly what is meant by "socio-economic factors" or
exactly what type of "analysis" is expected of the local agency.
One of the possibilities open for analysis, however, is a determination of what social roles are being performed by the individual
seeking assistance. All of which is well and good until the roles of
the individuals are defined in a discriminatory manner.
According to Colquitt Walker of the University of California:
If a woman can do light tasks around her own home, such as
washing dishes and making up a bed, she may not be considered
totally disabled and may have benefits denied. A man, however,
will be judged on his ability to work in full-time employment at his
usual occupation. If he can no longer hold a job, he will be
considered totally disabled. Under such a test it is obviously easier
for a man to prove his disability than a woman. 60

The regulation utilizes as a standard the ability to perform one's
usual occupation. Thus, a woman whose physical or psychological conditions would allow her to do light houskeeping tasks but
would disable her from obtaining outside employment, would
not be considered eligible for assistance where housekeeping was
her usual occupation. As Walker notes, this regulation ignores the
fact that because a woman can do homemaking in her own home,
there is no more indication that she is having her economic needs
met than there would be for a man. Walker concludes that "such
regulations are cruel in their application and work hardships on
the very women the program should be helping-those who are
too sick to earn a living wage." '61
While, at least, the regulations for this program recognize
homemaking (the traditional women's role) as a function worthy
of support, it is clear that the impact of the regulations is to make
58.
59.
60.
61.

HSSD Manual §231.541.
HSSD Manual§ 231.543.
Walker, supra note 52 at 291.
Id. at 292.
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it harder for the woman in this role to demonstrate her disability
than it is for the male to demonstrate his disability from full-time
employment. It seems at least arguable that such an evidentiary
barrier would be in violation of the New Mexico Equal Rights
Amendment. It is submitted that these regulations should be
revised to set one standard that would have to be met to
demonstrate disability: inability to obtain outside employment
for wages.
CONCLUSION

It is clear that our present society makes assumptions about the
proper roles of individuals in family units and differentiates those
roles on the basis of the family member's sex. It is further clear
that the present welfare system, in its regulatory apparatus and its
administration, reflects these societal assumptions. Thus, the
"breadwinner" in the family is considered the male; he is
encouraged and indeed forced to go outside the home and seek
employment for wages. The woman is relegated to performing
the services traditionally supplied within the home. She is the
cook, cleaner, dishwasher, nurse, and chauffeur. On the one
hand, the present welfare system reinforces these assumptions,
impelling them to reality. The traditional mother's functions,
when provided by a natural parent, are ascribed no economic
value and hence are not included in the lists of needs for which
AFDC benefits will provide. Thus, the woman is economically
coerced to remain in the home because the AFDC benefits will
not provide for the purchase of services she cannot herself
provide if she seeks outside employment. Moreover, the father
who wishes to remain at home and provide these benefits is
substantially disabled from doing so. Both in the eligibility
criteria and in the make-up of the AFDC-UF program, he is
impelled to seek outside employment.
While reinforcing these underlying sex-role assumptions on the
one hand, the welfare program is ignoring them on the other
hand. Thus, as to age eligibility criteria in the AFDC program,
the regulations ignore any value to the traditional woman's role
and conditions eligibility only to those persons who will assume
the traditional male role, that of wage-earner. What is wrong in
all of this is not merely a subscription to society's basic
assumptions and prejudices. The real evil and harm lie in the
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ability of the welfare system to make these assumptions reality.
The power of welfare administrators to mold the attitudes and
responses of their clients is enormous. This is so not only because
the welfare administrator provides the basic means of support to
the client, but also because traditionally welfare clients are
among the most vulnerable members of our society. The result is
that the system effectively eliminates the free will of the
individual recipient. The recipient has no choice as to which role
in the family unit he or she will play. The male must be the
breadwinner; the female must be the homemaker. If the recipient
wants to change roles, the welfare system is incapable of
responding to that change and substantially disables the recipient
from doing so.
That this is so is understandable when one looks to the history
of our major welfare programs. They were originally designed
expressly for women and only for those women who fit the image
society had of them. Our present society, however, is in the midst
of a basic change in attitudes. The original assumptions are
breaking down; they are being replaced by new attitudes. It is
incumbent on the welfare system to reflect the new awareness.
The Equal Rights Amendment cannot in itself completely
remake the social and economic structures which now work such
a disadvantage on poor women. It would be a great step,
however, and would, if properly implemented, have ramifications
in a large number of areas. It would render invalid the
distinctions made in the welfare provisions mentioned in the
preceding sections. But more than that, it would work toward
equalizing a woman's economic opportunities and would, in
some cases, thereby eliminate the need for welfare. It has been
argued that an equal rights amendment is not desirable since it
would shift even more economic burdens onto the already
over-burdened shoulders of poor mothers. However, more realistically, it is argued that:
Women generally bear the greater burden of supporting and
raising children and the ERA, although requiring equality of
obligations, would not make that burden heavier. It would not
preclude requiring one parent to make child support payments
while the other parent makes her (or his) contribution in the form
of care and up-bringing. 62
62. Eastwood, The FederalBar v. The Ale House Bar: Women and Public Aceomodations,
5
Valpariso U. L. Rev. 281, 303 (1971).
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To apply the requirements and benefits of government welfare
programs evenly would require running counter to some of the
socially acceptable sex-role stereotypes of our society. It is
strongly urged, however, that to prevent a single father from
staying home with his children and from being a homemaker, if
that is his wish, but allowing a single mother to do so is
discriminatory and would be counter to the Equal Rights
Amendment. Similarly, requiring a mother to perform homemaking tasks against her will by economic coercion or by barring
her from work or training programs because of her sex would be
unconstitutional if the ERA is passed. The Amendment will have
the effect of requiring changes.

